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1. Introduction. 
This article deals with the collective labour law aspects of the 
labour protection of non-standard workers. It aims at contributing to 
further the debate on the need to adapt existing regulatory frameworks 
and policy strategies to face the growth of the non-standard workforce in 
recent decades. Arguably, a vast part of this debate has concentrated on 
issues related to individual employment law and social security1. Less 
attention has been given, instead, to the questions that the emergence of 
non-standard work in modern labour markets poses to the regulation of 
collective rights2, and in particular of collective action.  
This article argues that many of the existing limitations and 
restrictions to the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike 
disproportionately affect non-standard workers. Indeed, in some cases, 
these restrictions go as far as denying, legally or as a matter of fact, 
access of non-standard workers to collective rights. This article, thus, is 
meant at reorienting part of the  current legal and policy debate on non-
standard work on its collective dimensions. It provides examples of 
limitations that hamper the exercise of collective rights in a way that fails 
to keep pace with the changes occurred in labour markets and societies 
at large in recent decades, such as the increased number of workers 
involved in non-standard forms of employment, but also globalisation and 
some of the related consequences on business and work organisation. It 
																																																								
1 Extensive references and data are provided in ILO, Non-standard forms of employment. 
Report for discussion at the Meeting of Experts on Non-Standard Forms of Employment 
(Geneva, 16–19 February 2015) (Geneva, ILO: 2015). The scientific literature on this 
debate is extremely vast: see A. Supiot, Beyond Employment. Changes in Work and the 
Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); G. Bosch, 
‘Towards a new standard employment relationship in Western Europe’ (2004) 42 British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 617-636; L. Vosko,  Managing the Margins Gender, 
Citizenship, and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); G. Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2011); M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal 
Work Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); J. Fudge, S. McCrystal and K. 
Sankaran, Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2012); K. V. 
W. Stone and H. Arthurs (eds.), Rethinking Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard 
Contract of Employment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013); Z. Adams and S. 
Deakin, ‘Institutional Solutions to Inequality and Precariousness in Labour Markets’ (2014) 
52 British Journal of Industrial Relations 779-809; J. Rubery, ‘Reregulating for inclusive 
labour markets’, ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series Working Paper No. 65. 
2 See, however, the contributions published in C. Thronley, S. Jeffreys and B Appay (eds.), 
Globalisation and Precarious Forms of Production and Employment: Challenges for Workers 
and Unions (Cheltenam, Edward Elgar, 2010) and in Meeting the challenge of Precarious 
Work: A Workers’ Agenda (2013) 5 International Journal of Labour Research; A. J. S. 
Calvin, ‘Organizational Primacy: Employment Conflict in a Post–Standard Contract World’ in 
Stone and Arthurs (n. 1). 
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also examines whether these limitations, many of which were formulated 
to address the economic and legal landscapes existing at the time of their 
enactment, are still fit to govern current labour markets or whether they 
have become unreasonably burdensome for the present. In doing so, 
constant reference will be to a legal development that has occurred since 
some of the existing standards on collective action were introduced, 
namely the evolution of the rationale of the right to strike “from being a 
weapon in collective bargaining into an individual human right”, remarked 
by Professor Sir Bob Hepple QC, in one of his last works 3 . In this 
perspective, this article argues that existing regulations of the right to 
strike should be reassessed to investigate whether they are compatible 
with the “human right” status of the right to strike and in particular 
whether they are necessary, in democratic societies, to ensure the 
fulfilment of other basic needs, in particular the exercise of other human 
rights.   
Section 2 will discuss non-standard forms of employment as they 
were recently described by the International Labour Organisation and 
how the label “non-standard work” is preferable to some of its 
counterpart such as “precarious” and “atypical” work. It will be argued 
that reference to the distinction between “standard” and “non-standard” 
work is still meaningful as the standard employment relationship (SER) is 
still a central institution in modern labour markets both from an empirical 
and from a regulatory standpoint and that this distinction is also useful to 
investigate about the endogenous role of regulation, and also collective 
labour regulation, in the growth and spread of non-standard work 
arrangements. Section 3 will discuss some general problems that may 
affect non-standard workers in effectively exercising freedom of 
association and related collective rights. Section 4 will move from the 
consideration that the right to strike has evolved into an individual 
employment right and that this has a particular significance in assessing 
the existing restrictions to collective rights that may disproportionately 
affect non-standard workers. The other sections will analyse specifically 
examples of these restrictions. Section 5 will discuss the obstacles that 
regulation on strike ballots may pose to non-standard workers. Section 6 
argues that existing standards on secondary action have grown 
outmoded as a consequence of the disintegration of the vertical firm and 
the related fissurisation of the workplace occurred in the last decades. 
Section 7 examines how antitrust regulation could prohibit some parts of 
																																																								
3 B. Hepple, ‘The Freedom to Strike and its Rationales’ in B. Hepple, R. le Roux and S. 
Sciarra (eds.), Laws against strikes. The South African Experience in an International and 
Comparative Perspective (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2015).  
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the non-standard workforce to accede to collective bargaining and 
therefore to exercise freedom of association. Section 8 argues that the 
distinction between political and economic strikes fails to keep pace with 
policies that materially affect non-standard workers such as those aimed 
at shifting the focus of labour protection from the enterprise to labour 
markets as a whole. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Non-Standard Work, the Enduring Role of the SER 
and the endogeneity of regulation in the growth of 
non-standard arrangements.  
Non-standard forms of employment were recently described by 
the International Labour Organisation to “include, among others, fixed-
term contracts and other forms of temporary work, temporary agency 
work and other contractual arrangements involving multiple parties, 
disguised employment relationships, dependent self-employment and 
part-time work”. It is arguably an open description as the list of the 
possible work arrangements that are indicated as “non-standard” is a 
non-exhaustive one: nonetheless, it conveys a rather comprehensive 
picture of the various possible non-standard types of employment in 
formal economies across the globe. In this article, I will use the term 
“non-standard” work and use this description as a point of reference.  
This is not only because they were both adopted in the Conclusions of an  
ILO meeting of national experts selected on a tripartite basis, which were 
endorsed by the Governing Body of the ILO4, and therefore have met a 
significant consensus at the international level, but also because the term 
non-standard work is theoretically preferable to other terms that are 
often used to refer to similar phenomenon.  
One of the terms most frequently used as counterparts of “non-
standard employment”, “precarious work”, for instance, for as evocative 
as it is, it arguably extends much beyond the borders of non-standard 
work5. A worker may very well experience precariousness also when they 
are in a SER, for instance when regulation against unfair dismissal is so 
scarce that she is not effectively protected against arbitrary acts of the 
																																																								
4  ILO, Governing Body, 323rd Session, Geneva, 12–27 March 2015, Conclusions of the 
Meeting of Experts on Non-Standard Forms of Employment  (Geneva: ILO, 2015) available 
at       http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meeting 
document/wcms_354090.pdf (Accessed 8 October 2015). The Conclusions start at page 50. 
5 On this point, also for comprehensive references to the debate, see N. Kountouris, ‘The 
Legal Determinants of Precariousness in Personal Work Relations: a European Perspective’ 
(2013) 34 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 21-46; M. Paret ‘Precarious Class 
Formations in the United States and South Africa’ forthcoming in International Labor and 
Working-Class History. 
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employer or when a long length of service is necessary to qualify for 
labour protections such as maternity leave, redundancy pay or action 
against unfair dismissal. In addition, not every non-standard worker is 
precarious, as there could be non-standard work contracts that 
nonetheless afford sufficient stability of employment and income, such as 
some form of fixed-term or part-time contracts.  
The expression “atypical work”, instead, presents non-negligible 
flaws in legal terms: in some civil law traditions “contratto atipico”, 
contrato atípico” or “atypischer Vertrag” technically refer to contracts that 
are not specifically regulated: this is not true for a vast number of non-
standard contracts6. On the contrary, fixed-term work, temporary agency 
work, dependent self-employment and part-time work are explicitly 
regulated in a vast number of legal systems, at the international, regional 
and national level7. 
Having said so, it can still be argued that, by referring to “non-
standard employment”, one acquiesces with a SER-centric vision of 
labour markets, one that is inevitably becoming outmoded as the SER 
grows ever more displaced by other forms of work8 and social norms 
traditionally associated with the SER such as the male breadwinner model 
and the related gender contract on the division of labour in the household 
are receding9. This objection, however, would be at odds with empirical 
evidence that suggests that “despite the growth of non-standard work in 
many regions of the world the [SER] remains the dominant form of 
employment in industrialized countries, accounting for 70 per cent of jobs 
in Europe and the United States. In emerging economies, such as Brazil 
and Argentina, most jobs created in the 2000s were formal jobs with 
indefinite contracts” 10. On the one hand, thus, the SER seems far from 
being vanishing in numerical terms. On the other, notwithstanding the 
removal or weakening of regulatory barriers against recourse to non-
standard forms of work, both in terms of legislation than in terms of 
unionisation and collective bargaining, the SER maintains its role as a 
																																																								
6 See G. De Nova, Il tipo contrattuale (Padova: Cedam, 1974); M.C. Gete-Alonso y Calera, 
Estructura y función del tipo contractual (Barcelona: Bosh, 1979). More generally, on the 
idea of “type” and the law, see H. Wolf, ‘Typen im Recht und in der Rechtswissenschaft’ 
(1952) Studium Generale 195-205. 
7 For a comparative overview of this regulation see ILO (n. 1). 
8  See for instance K.V.W. Stone ‘The Decline in the Standard Employment Contract: A 
Review of the Evidence’ in Stone and Arthurs (n. 1) 
9 See L. Vosko, ‘Precarious Employment and the Problem of SER-Centrism in Regulating for 
Decent Work” in S. Lee and D. McCann, Regulating for Decent Work: New Directions in 
Labour Market Regulation (Basingstoke and Geneva: Palgrave Macmillan and ILO, 2011).  
10 ILO (n. 1) 4. 
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benchmark of employment regulation in most jurisdictions of the world11. 
Nor should it be taken for granted that the growth of non-standard work 
is a “natural” and irreversible economic phenomenon that is independent 
from the relevant regulatory framework: it can instead be argued that 
regulation plays an endogenous role in the emergence and spread of non-
standard work in different countries 12 . A prominent example in this 
respect, is the development of the doctrine of Mutuality of Obligation and 
its impact on the spread of casual employment, particularly in the form of 
zero hour arrangements, in the United Kingdom13. This is not only true 
for regulation that allows or enlarges the scope of lawful recourse to 
various forms of non-standard work 14  but also for regulation that 
promotes it as a cheap alternative to standard workers. This is arguably 
the case of some existing social security and unemployment benefit 
regulation in some European countries such as “mini-jobs” in Germany 
and “zero hour” contracts in the United Kingdom15. In Italy, instead, the 
spread of “parasubordinate” work was also arguably an unintended effect 
of civil procedural rules and social security regulation16.  
																																																								
11 G. Bosch (n. 1); Z. Adams and S. Deakin (n. 1). 
12 See S. E. Gleason (ed.), The shadow workforce: Perspectives on contingent work in the 
United States, Japan, and Europe (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, 2006). G. Meardi, ‘The Claimed Growing Irrelevance of Employment Relations” 56 
Journal of Industrial Relations 594-605; Z. Adams and S. Deakin (n. 1). On the general 
endogenous role of regulation in labour markets see S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, The Law of 
the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment, and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).. 
13 See N. Countouris, ‘Uses and Misues of ‘Mutuality of Obligations’ and the Autonomy of 
Labour Law’ LRI WP 1/2014 (March 2015). See also A. Adams, M. Freedland and J. Prassl, 
‘The “Zero-Hours Contract: Regulating Casual Work or Legitimising Precarity?’ ELLN - 
Working Paper No 5 (March 2015). 
14  See, for instance, also for a review of the economic literature in this respect, M. 
Aleksynska and J. Berg, Understanding firms’ demand for temporary labour in developing 
countries’, forthcoming in the ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series Working 
Paper: using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey of private sector firms in 
developing countries, the Authors show how firms in countries where fixed-term contracts 
are prohibited for permanent tasks are statistically less likely to use temporary labour. 
15 See Z. Adams and S. Deakin, Re-regulating Zero Hours Contracts (Liverpool: the Institute 
of Employment Rights, 2014). 
16 See V. De Stefano, ‘Smuggling-in Flexibility: Temporary Work Contracts and the “Implicit 
Threat” Mechanisms. Reflections on a New European Path’ (2009) 4 Labour Administration 
and Inspection Programme LAB/ADMIN Working Document (Geneva: International Labour 
Organization), 24, arguing that the first time Italian law meaningfully regulated 
parasubordinate relationships or “collaborazioni”, “only procedural rules were extended to 
them”. However, “the mere fact that the legislator mentioned them as self-employment 
relationships on a continuous and coordinated basis, distinct from traditional relationships of 
that kind, was interpreted by firms as the legislator’s consent to firm-integrated working 
activities not covered by the legal and collective protections of the employment relationship. 
In 1973, the first elements and practices of Post-Fordism were already starting to gain 
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Restrictions and limitations to collective rights that 
disproportionately affect non-standard workers can be another prominent 
example of regulation providing undue incentives to recur to non-
standard work. Examining these restrictions and advocating their 
revision, therefore, does not imply an acknowledgement that the erosion 
of the SER both in empirical terms and as a regulatory model is an 
irreversible, let alone completed, phenomenon.   
A further objection can be that there is no need to adopt a generic 
“umbrella” term to group the distinct forms of work contract deviating 
from the SER and that it is instead opportune to analyse and refer to any 
such form individually. Despite being aware of the potential shortcomings 
of adopting any generic term to group different legal phenomena, it can 
however be useful to have a general framework to refer to, when dealing 
with non-standard work. This is the case, for instance, when addressing 
situations in which two or more “non-standard” dimension sum up: a 
worker may very well be hired on a fixed-term contract by a temporary 
work agency and work part-time at the same time. Forms of non-
standard work are often associated and should not be regarded only on a 
discrete basis. In addition, referring to a more general class can prove 
worthwhile, when it is necessary to examine some common problems 
that affect non-standard workers. One of such problems is certainly the 
widespread difficulty to effectively access the Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, such as freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labour, effective abolition of child labour, 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
Examining all these difficulties goes beyond the scope of this 
article but, it is worthwhile to mention them to stress the point that non-
standard work raises issues that relate to human rights besides freedom 
of association. It is a fact, for instance, that workers in vulnerable 
categories, which are most at risk of discrimination, are almost 
systematically over-represented in non-standard work17. Having said so, 
freedom of association is one of the areas that certainly deserves more 
attention. The following section will argue that non-standard workers may 
indeed face peculiar hardships in exercising this freedom. 
 
																																																																																																																																															
ground. This resulted in the ever-increasing use of “collaborazioni” as a cheaper alternative 
to permanent employment relationships […] When, in 1995, modest social security 
contributions and employment tax were extended to “collaborazioni”, this, far from 
constituting a disincentive, fostered the idea that they were a low-cost substitute for 
employment, in consequence of which they became more popular than ever”. 
17 See ILO (n. 1) for data in this respect. 
NON-STANDARD WORKERS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
RESTRICTIONS TO COLLECTIVE RIGHTS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
9 
	
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 123/2015	
	
3. Freedom of association and non-standard workers. 
Notoriously, freedom of association is not only a right in itself but 
is also an “enabling right” as its exercise may be pivotal in securing the 
effective exercise of other workers’ right18. Collective rights such as the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to industrial action are 
arguably some of the key instruments through which labour rights are 
secured. The right to strike, in particular, and especially when industrial 
action is allowed for conflicts of rights, may also be a chief tool of private 
enforcement for labour rights19. This is also why special attention must be 
paid to the right to strike when dealing with non-standard work.  
Indeed, some non-standard workers, and in particular those in 
temporary relationships, irrespective of the specific type of contract, may 
be reluctant to exercise some of the labour rights they could be entitled 
to, in fear that their contract may not be renewed or prolonged at its 
expiry, should they do so20. This actual or perceived “implicit threat” of 
losing one’s job may cause severe decent work deficits as a matter of 
																																																								
18 On the role of trade unions in ensuring enforcement and effectiveness of employment 
rights, see, recently M. O’Sullivan, T. Turner, M. Kennedy, and J. Wallace, ‘Is Individual 
Employment Law Displacing the Role of Trade Unions?’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 
222-245; on the inadequacy of individual employment law in securing effective labour 
protection, particularly for non-standard casual workers, see A. Polliert, ‘The Unorganised 
Worker: The Decline in Collectivism and New Hurdles to Individual Employment Rights’ 
(2005) 34 Industrial Law Journal 217-238. 
19 In jurisdictions were industrial action can only be called to deal with conflicts of interests, 
instead, strike may however be essential in securing rights for non-standard workers such 
as “stabilisation” plans: I owe credit, without implicating, to Judy Fudge for the observation 
on conflicts of interest.  
20 The ILO Supervisory Bodies highlighted how recourse to non-standard forms of work may 
have a detrimental impact on union rights and collective bargaining. For instance, the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and Recommendations (CEACR) 
reported that “one of the main concerns indicated by trade union organizations is the 
negative impact of precarious forms of employment on trade union rights and labour 
protection, notably short-term temporary contracts repeatedly renewed; subcontracting, 
even by certain governments in their own public service to fulfil statutory permanent tasks; 
and the non-renewal of contracts for anti-union reasons. Some of these modalities often 
deprive workers’ access to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, 
particularly when they hide a real and permanent employment relationship. Some forms of 
precariousness can dissuade workers from trade union membership”, see ILO, CEACR, 
General Survey on the fundamental Conventions concerning rights at work in light of the 
ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008, Report III (Part 1B), 
International Labour Conference, 101st Session, 2012 (Geneva: ILO, 2012) 386. The ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) observed how “in certain circumstances, the 
renewal of fixed-term contracts for several years may alter the exercise of trade union 
rights: see Chile – CFA, 368th Report, Case No. 2884. 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_T
EXT_ID:3128139 (Accessed 8 October 2015). 
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fact, even when the applicable regulatory framework is not unfavourable 
to non-standard workers 21 . The right to strike may be relevant in 
different and opposite ways in this respect. One the one hand, as an 
instrument of private enforcement of rights, the right to industrial action 
can facilitate rendering labour rights effective for non-standard workers 
without their having to recur to individual enforcement mechanisms such 
as grievance procedures or judicial claims. On the other hand, the right 
to strike and other collective rights, including the right to organise in 
itself may be particularly affected by the “implicit threat” of losing one’s 
job22. This is also because, whilst in some jurisdictions specific statutory 
remedies may be in place against dismissals originating from industrial 
disputes and actions, or discriminatory or retaliatory dismissals against 
union members or workers representative, such remedies may not 
extend or be easily circumvented for non-standard workers in temporary 
work, by simply not renewing or prolonging their contracts, or for “on-
demand” workers, by “zeroing down” their working hours.  
This may also offer an explanation of the difficulties in organising 
non-standard workers in trade unions, albeit in some cases failure to 
organise them can be attributable to frictions and reluctance of the 
“standard” unionised workforce to allow non-standard workers to join or 
to act on their behalf23. In several countries, however, trade unions have 
taken steps to secure unionisation and protection, also via collective 
bargaining, for non-standard workers 24 . Nonetheless, “implicit threat” 
effects and the potential shortcomings and loopholes in anti-retaliatory 
regulation can pose serious hurdles to these efforts.  
																																																								
21 See V. De Stefano (n. 16). 
22 V. De Stefano (n.  16); J. Holdcroft, ‘Implications for union work of the trend towards 
precarization of work’ Meeting the challenge of Precarious Work: A Workers’ Agenda (n. 2) 
43 reports that “the most important reason for precarious workers not joining trade unions 
stems from a legitimate fear of losing their job. Whenever unions conduct surveys to 
discover why such workers do not join unions, this is the principal reason given”. See also 
E. Hatton ‘Temporary Weapons: Employers’ Use of Temps Against Organised Labour’ (2014) 
67 ILR Review 86–110. 
23 Holdcroft (n. 22) discusses cases in which unions had to reform their statutes to allow 
non-standard workers to join and strategies to overcome hostility from existing members. 
24 See, for instance, R. Gumbrell-McCormick, ‘European trade unions and ‘atypical’ workers’ 
(2011) 42 Industrial Relations Journal 293–310; S. Hayter and M. Ebisui, ‘Negotiating parity 
for precarious workers’ Meeting the challenge of Precarious Work: A Workers’ Agenda (n. 
2); K. Nakamura and M. Nitta ‘Organizing Nonstandard Workers in Japan: Old Players and 
New Players’ in Stone and Arthurs (n. 1); M. Keune, ‘Trade Unions, Precarious Work and 
Dualisation in Europe’ in W. Eichhorst and P. Marx (eds.), Non-Standard Employment in 
Post-Industrial Labour Markets An Occupational Perspective (Cheltenam: Edward Elgar, 
2015); ILO (n. 1); F.L. Cooke and R. Brown, ‘The Regulation of Non-Standard Forms of 
Work in China, Japan and Republic of Korea A Study to the International Labour 
Organization’ ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series Working Paper No. 64. 
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As stated above, the debate on the need to adjust existing 
regulations to take into account the increased share of non-standard 
workers in labour markets in recent times has commonly being treated 
from an individual employment law standpoint. The following sections of 
this article highlight how there are important collective labour law issues 
that need to be rediscussed to keep pace with the growth of the non-
standard workforce in modern labour markets. As mentioned above, 
some existing restrictions might have disproportionate impact on the 
non-standard workforce and indeed provide undue incentives to recur to 
these forms of work as a cheap alternative to standard employment. 
Some of these restrictions, it will be highlighted below, might indeed 
have been introduced with regard to models of business and work 
organisation no longer dominant. In analysing these restrictions to assess 
whether they are still reasonable for the present, however, not only new 
trends in the economic landscape but also significant legal developments 
in the theoretical construction of labour rights, and in particular the rights 
to collective bargaining and to take collective action, occurred in 
relatively recent times, must be taken into account. These developments 
will be examined in the next section.  
4. Collective labour rights as human rights and 
implications for non-standard workers. 
In one of his last works Professor Hepple gave account of the 
evolution of the right to strike from a tool in collective bargaining to a 
human right 25 . This issue forms part of the general debate on the 
construction of labour rights as human rights 26  and has gathered 
																																																								
25 B. Hepple (n. 3). The same argument was hold by S. Sciarra ‘’Heritage and Adjustment’: 
Some Concluding Remarks’ in B. Hepple, R. le Roux, S. Sciarra (n. 3). See T. Novitz, 
International and European Protection of the Right to Strike: A Comparative Study of 
Standards Set by the International Labour Organization, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); K.D. Ewing, ‘Myth and Reality of 
the Right to Strike as a “Fundamental Labour Right”’ (2013) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 145-165. 
26 Comprehensive contribution and references to this debate are provided in C. Fenwick and 
T. Novitz, Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart, 2010). See also D. Kolben, ‘Labor Rights as Human Rights?’ Virginia 
International Law Review (2010) 50 450-484; V. Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human 
Rights?’ (2012) 3 Europan Labour Law Journal 151-172. J. Fudge ‘The New Discourse of 
Labour Rights: From Social to Fundamental Rights?’ (2007) 29 Comparative Labour Law & 
Policy Journal  29-66 and V. Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on 
Human Rights: An Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ 
Human Rights Law Review (2013) 13 529-555 argue in favour of the recognition of labour 
right as human rights; contrary to this recognition, A. Arthurs, ‘Who’s afraid of 
globalization? Reflections on the future of labour law’ in J.D.R. Craig and S.M. Lynk (eds.), 
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significant attention in connection with recent landmark decisions of 
supranational and national supreme courts 27 . Whilst examining the 
reasons for considering labour rights, and the right to strike in particular, 
as human rights goes beyond the scope of this article, this question is 
strongly interrelated with the issue of securing effective access of non-
standard workers to collective rights. 
Categorising workers’ right to take industrial action as a human 
right, actually, must prompt a reflection on the legal restrictions posed to 
this right. It goes without saying that the right to strike, as any other 
right, including human rights, can be limited. Indeed, no legal system 
recognises an entirely unrestricted right to strike, even when this right is 
protected at the constitutional level28. Nonetheless, considering the right 
																																																																																																																																															
Globalization and the Future of Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); an intermediate approach is followed by H. Collins, ‘Theories of Rights as 
Justifications for Labour Law’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds.), The Idea of Labour Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
27 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Demir and Baykara v Turkey, 12 November 
2008, Application no. 34503/97; ECtHR, Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey, 21 April 2009, 
Application no. 68959/01; ECtHR, Danilenkov and Others. v Russia, 10 December 2009, 
Application no. 67336/01; ECtHR, Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v Romania, , 31 January 
2012, Application no. 2330/09; ECtHR, RMT v United Kingdom, 8 April 2014, Application no. 
31054/10. Constitutional Court of South Africa, Bader Pop (pty) Ltd v NUNMSA, 2002 
Industrial Law Journal (South Africa) 104 (LAC); Supreme Court of Canada, Dunmore v 
Ontario (AG), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, 2001 SCC 94; Supreme Court of Canada, Health 
Service and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v British Columbia, [2007] SCC 
27; Supreme Court of Canada, Ontario (AG) v. Fraser, [2011]SCC 20. On the decisions and 
their implications see Langille B. (2008). Can we Rely on the ILO? (2007) 13 Canada 
Journal of Labour and Employment Law 273-300; S. van Eck, “Constitutionalisation of South 
African Labour Law: An Experiment in the Making’ in Fenwick and Novitz (n. 26); K.D. 
Ewing, J. Handy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial 
Law Journal, (2010) 2-51; F. Dorssemont ‘How the European Court of Human Rights gave 
us Enerji to cope with Laval and Viking’ in M.A. Moreau (ed.), Before and after the economic 
crisis: what implications for the ‘European Social Model’? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011); J. Fudge, ‘Constitutional Rights, Collective Bargaining and the Supreme Court of 
Canada: Retreat and Reversal in the Fraser Case’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 1-29; T. 
Novitz, ‘The Internationally Recognized Right to Strike: A Past, Present, and Future Basis 
upon Which to Evaluate Remedies for Unlawful Collective Action?’ (2014) 30 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 357–379; A. Bogg and K.D. 
Ewing, ‘The Implications of the RMT Case’ (2014) 43 Industrial Law Journal 221-252; V. 
Velyvyte, ‘The Right to Strike in the European Union after Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Identifying Conflict and Achieving Coherence’ (2015) 15  
Human Rights Law Review 73-100.  
28 On the limitations in national constitutional traditions see H. Cheadle, ‘Constitutionalising 
the Right to Strike’ in B. Hepple, R. le Roux, S. Sciarra (n. 3); a related analysis concerning 
international and regional systems is carried out by T. Novitz, ‘The International and 
Regional Framework’ ibid. A comprehensive comparative review of national regulations of 
the right to strike is contained in ILO, Background document for the Tripartite Meeting on 
the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 
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to strike a human right also calls for these restrictions to be limited only 
to those strictly necessary in securing the exercise of other human rights. 
Allowing broader restrictions, indeed, may endanger not only the right to 
strike: a severely limited human right to industrial action would imply 
tolerance for unnecessary limits to human rights and put in jeopardy, or 
at least water down, the entire human rights discourse. Reviewing 
current restrictions, as already mentioned, is also essential to ensure that 
the possibility of meaningfully exercising collective labour rights is 
granted to all workers, as existing limits to unionisation, collective 
bargaining and industrial action may pose significant barriers for 
increasing portions of the workforce and in particular for non-standard 
workers. 
There are several important aspects that call for a joint analysis of 
the classification of labour, and in particular collective rights as human 
rights and the access of non-standard workers to those rights. 
A rationale for approaching labour rights in connection with human 
rights lies with managerial prerogatives29. The employment relationship is 
notoriously based on the social and legal power of one party vis-à-vis the 
other. In any jurisdiction, laws, customs and practices grant employers 
with extensive rights on workers, such as the power to direct and control 
their working activity and the power to discipline them in case of breach 
of their duties: managerial prerogatives are therefore not only a result of 
economic phenomenon such as inequality of bargaining power but are 
also enshrined in regulation that vest employers with an authority over 
their workers that goes beyond social norms and is also recognised from 
the legal standpoint30. These prerogatives and this authority may affect 
the workers’ dignity as human beings and, therefore, their limitation and 
rationalisation – which is one of the core concepts of labour law – is also 
relevant from the human rights’ perspective31.  Non-standard workers are 
																																																																																																																																															
87), in relation to the right to strike and the modalities and practices of strike action at 
national level (revised) (Geneva, 23–25 February 2015) (Geneva: ILO, 2015); see also B. 
Waas (ed.), The Right To Strike. A Comparative View (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2014). 
29 V. De Stefano, La protezione del diritto di sciopero nella dialettica tra corti e organi di 
supervisione internazionali (2014) Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali 
461-494. 
30 See R. De Luca Tamajo, La Norma inderogabile nel diritto del lavoro (Napoli: Jovene, 
1976); A. Supiot, Critique du droit du travail (Paris: PUF, 1994); E. Dockes, ‘De la 
supériorité du contrat de travail sur le pouvoir de l’employeur’ in  Analyse juridique et 
valeurs en Droit social, Etudes offertes à Jean Pélissier (Paris : Dalloz, 2004). 
31 See L. Mengoni,  ‘I poteri dell’imprenditore’ in L. Mengoni, Diritto e valori (Bologna: il 
Mulino, 1985. The essay is dated 1975); H. Collins, ‘Utility and rights in Common Law 
Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law through Constitutionalization’ LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 6/2007; O. De Schutter, ‘Human Rights in Employment 
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arguably exposed to some mechanisms that may magnify employers’ 
managerial prerogatives such as “implicit threat” 32  effects as well as 
“extended entry tournament” effects 33 . Reinforcing instruments to 
counter the potential enhancement of managerial prerogatives is 
therefore essential to secure protection of their human dignity at the 
workplace. Since the rights to collective bargaining and action represent 
a chief instrument of limiting and rationalising managerial prerogatives34, 
granting access of non-standard workers to these rights is also pivotal to 
provide effective safeguard of their human rights. Moreover, coupling the 
labour rights’ and human rights’ discourses in this respect is also 
opportune for addressing other dimensions of vulnerability of non-
standard workers given the mentioned over-representation of, among 
others, women, immigrants, young people and senior workers among the 
non-standard workforce35.  
The construction of collective rights as human rights, therefore, 
can undoubtedly have specific beneficial effects for non-standard workers 
that must be given adequate attention when reassessing restrictions to 
the right to collective bargaining and the right to strike in order to keep 
pace with the growth of the non-standard workforce. In the following 
sections, I will highlight some of the areas in which this reassessment 
seems especially needed in light of what has been discussed so far. 
 
																																																																																																																																															
Relationships: Contracts as Power’ in F. Dorssemont, K. Lörcher, I. Schömann (eds.), The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013). 
32 De Stefano (n. 16) 
33  D. Marsden, ‘The growth of extended “entry tournaments” and the decline of 
institutionalised occupational labour markets in Britain’ in Lee and McCann (n.  9), describes 
extended entry tournaments as mechanisms emerged in modern labour markets whereby 
workers are constrained to engage in several short-term and project-based work 
arrangements used by firms as screening processes before having the opportunity to be 
employed on a long-term basis, this also for occupation and in sectors where access to 
stable employment was formerly more direct. 
34  See O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law (London: Stevens 1972); S. Liebman, 
Individuale e collettivo nel contratto di lavoro (Milano: Giuffrè 1993).  
35 Exemplary in this respect are the issues raised by the Swedish Lex Laval, which was hold 
by the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) to violate not only Articles 6§1 and 
6§4 of the European Social Charter, protecting the rights to collective bargaining and strike, 
but also the rights of migrant workers not to be discriminated against in respect to 
“remuneration and other employment and working conditions “ and “membership of trade 
unions and enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining”, under Article 19§4 of the 
same Charter. See Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees (TCO) v Svezia, 3 July 2013, Complaint No. 85/2012; De Stefano 
(n. 29). 
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5. Fragmented societies and collective rights: non-
standard workers, minority unions and strike ballots. 
Compelling arguments to justify the right to strike where famously 
presented by Professor Sir Otto Kahn Freund36 in the 1970s and were 
recently re-examined by Bob Hepple37 in light of developments that have 
occurred since those arguments were first outlined. In this analysis, a 
chief development is globalisation that, together with freedom of 
movement of capitals, magnifies employers’ managerial prerogatives by 
allowing them to delocalise production. I will return to the particular 
significance of globalisation with regard to freedom of association and 
non-standard work in section 6 below.  
Besides globalisation, however, the world of work has endured 
other profound transformations that have also driven changes in other 
sectors of society. It is an obvious statement that societies are more 
complex and uneven than they were when some of the existing 
regulation of unionism and collective action were devised. One does not 
need to subscribe entirely to Guy Standing’s argument that the growth in 
non-standard work originated a class, “the Precariat”, which is 
structurally separated and distinct from other sectors of the workforce38, 
to recognise that the world of work, particularly in industrialised 
countries, is now more composite and fragmented than it was four 
decades ago. This also calls into question some existing forms of labour 
representation. Most representative unions and union confederations 
remain pivotal institutions within labour markets and are fundamental in 
promoting solidarity across different sectors of the workforce and at 
combating inequality39. Indeed, one of the potential effects of policies 
aimed at the decentralisation of collective bargaining is arguably that 
decentralisation could weaken labour solidarity at the expenses of the 
weakest part of the workforce, and in particular of “outsider” non-
standard workers40. More complexities in societies and in the world of 
																																																								
36 O. Kahn-Freund and B. Hepple, Laws against Strikes (London: Fabian Research Series 
305, 1972). 
37 B. Hepple (n. 3). 
38 See G. Standing (n. 1); G. Standing, A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
39 See M. Ebisui, ‘Non-standard workers: Good practices of social dialogue and collective 
bargaining”’ Dialogue Working Paper No. 36 (Geneva: ILO, 2012); S. Hayter and M. Ebisui 
(n. 24); S. Hayter, ‘Unions and Collective Bargaining’ in J. Berg (ed.), Labour Markets 
Institutions and Inequality: Building Just Societies in the 21st Century (Cheltenham and 
Geneva: Edward Elgar and ILO, 2015).  
40 V. De Stefano, ‘A Tale of Oversimplification and Deregulation: The Mainstream Approach 
to Labour Market Segmentation and Recent Responses to the Crisis in European Countries’ 
(2014) 43 Industrial Law Journal, 253-285. 
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work, however may also result in the emergence of minority unions or 
other more “fluid” forms of workers’ movements: this process may very 
well also regard non-standard workers, given their abovementioned 
possible reluctance to join tradition unions or difficulties in doing so.  
Reassessing some of the existing regulation on unionisation and 
collective action may thus be necessary to better govern labour relations 
and avoid more severe social unrest. Several commentators have 
underlined how high numbers of non-standard workers, the 
fragmentation of the workforce through subcontracting, and its link with 
rivalry and violence between different unions, had a part in the notorious 
event in Marikana41. It would certainly be an exaggeration to suggest that 
these tragic incidents are an inevitable outcome of the so-called 
fissurisation of the workplace and the deriving limitations in workers’ 
representation42. Nonetheless, these phenomena call for action to prevent 
and solve inter-union, or other intra-workforce, conflicts that may occur 
as a consequence of fissuring practices.   
The recognition of the right to strike and collective labour rights as 
human rights should play a prominent role in these efforts. Safeguarding 
human rights is complete and effective only if those rights are also 
afforded to and protected for minorities; the regulation of collective 
bargaining and collective action should not be so restrictive to 
irremediably impede minority unions to accede to those rights43. Also 
very importantly, it should be verified whether existing restrictions 
																																																								
41  C. Chinguno, ‘Marikana: fragmentation, precariousness, strike violence and solidarity’ 
(2013) 40, Review of African Political Economy 639–646; K. Forrest, ‘Marikana was not just 
about migrant labour’, 13 September 2013 Mail & Guardian, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-13-00-marikana-was-not-just-about-migrant-labour 
(Accessed 8 October 2015). On the Marikana massacre, more in  general, see contributions 
in B. Hepple, R. le Roux and S. Sciarra (n. 3) and in particular J. Berg and S. Howell, 
‘Running the Gauntlet: Understanding Policing Responses and Strategies to Strike Action’. 
See also T. Ngcukaitobi, ‘Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the Platinum Hills 
of Marikana” (2013) 34 Industrial Law Journal (South Africa) 836- 858.  
42 See D. Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What 
Can Be Done to Improve It (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University 
Press, 2014). On the disintegration of vertical firms and its effects on workplaces and labour 
regulation see the landmark study H. Collins, ‘Independent Contractors and the Challenge of 
Vertical Disintegration’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353–380. 
43 According to the ILO CEACR, the recognition of most representative unions and the grant 
of specific advantages and rights to these unions is compatible with the principles of 
Freedom of Association enshrined in the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), provided that this does not entail ‘the effect of 
depriving those trade unions that are not recognized as being amongst the most 
representative of the essential means of defending the occupational interests of their 
members’: see, ILO, CEACR (n. 20) 36. 
NON-STANDARD WORKERS AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
RESTRICTIONS TO COLLECTIVE RIGHTS FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
17 
	
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 123/2015	
	
impose disproportionate hurdles for non-standard workers to unionise, 
bargain collectively and go on strike lawfully.  
A first limitation that may pose excessive burden to some non-
standard workers is strike ballots. Strike ballots normally require the 
presence of well-organised unions and a significant union density within 
the relevant bargaining unit. Moreover, the relevant regulations may also 
require unions to provide detailed information on the procedure followed, 
the electorate, the turnout etc. All this can prove extremely burdensome 
when material numbers of non-standard workers may be interested in 
striking.  
As recently argued by Luisa Corazza and Emma Fergus, ballot 
regulation may impose material obstacles for non-unionised workers to 
initiate a strike 44 . Since, as discussed above, unionisation of non-
standard workers can be difficult or scarce, also because they may be 
reluctant to unionise, in fear of retaliation, or difficult to reach by existing 
unions, regulation mandating strike ballots can disproportionately affect 
non-standard workers. This requires attentive scrutiny when assessing 
compliance of this regulation with the principles of freedom of association 
and of contrast to discrimination, including indirect discrimination, given 
the over-representation of women, immigrants, youth and seniors among 
non-standard workers45. Moreover, organising strike ballots and providing 
precise information on the relevant workforce can become excessively 
onerous in relation to very “casualised” workplaces. Highly volatile non-
standard work arrangements such as job-on-call, zero-hour contracts and 
marginal part-time work, together with extremely flexible schedules, are 
increasingly spreading in developed countries 46 . This renders the 
presence within a particular work unit unstable and workers more 
																																																								
44 L. Corazza and E. Fergus, ‘Representativeness and the Legitimacy of Bargaining Agents’ 
in B. Hepple, R. le Roux, S. Sciarra (n. 3). 
45 Notoriously, the UK regulation mandating strike ballots passed the ECtHR’s scrutiny under 
the lenses of freedom of association in the RMT case (n. 27), despite the fact that the ILO 
CEACR had expressed concern on this regulation. In RMT, the Court was content with the 
fact that the workers eventually managed to organise a successful strike, since “the Court 
can only examine complaints in light of their concrete facts”: see A. Bogg and K.D. Ewing 
(n. 27). RMT, therefore, does not prevent regulations on strike ballots from being 
reassessed on the basis of other circumstances, such as the significant impediment that 
such regulations may impose to non-unionised workers and in particular non-standard 
workers in the exercise of the right to strike.    
46  See, J. Berg and V. De Stefano, ‘Beyond “casual work”: old and new forms or 
casualization in developing and developed countries and what to do about it’, presentation 
at the 4th Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work Network (Geneva, 8-10 July 2015) 
available at http://www.rdw2015.org/download (Accessed 8 October 2015); J. Messenger 
and P. Wallot, ‘The Diversity of Marginal Part-Time’ INWORK Policy Brief No. 7 (Geneva: 
ILO, 2015). 
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detached from their workplaces and from existing workers’ 
representatives. Workforces are more scalable and dependent upon 
peaks in demand and therefore more variable: in these circumstances, 
organising a ballot and providing accurate information thereof could 
prove impossible, as a matter of fact. This could deprive workers of 
access to the ability to strike lawfully, encouraging wildcat strikes and 
illegal forms of collective action. The result may well be increasing 
tensions at the workplace and also within the workforce and prove far 
more disruptive for societies at large than less restrictive strike laws. In 
such a case, removing or relieving those hurdles would not only be just 
but also likely prevent unfairness from stirring unnecessary conflicts47. 
6. Promoting solidarity: secondary action, fissured 
workplaces and non-standard workers. 
Fostering solidarity among different workers and trying to counter 
the most detrimental effects of workforce’s fragmentation is another way 
to prevent conflicts. Very recently, for instance, the United States 
National Labour Relations Board refined its joint-employment status 
making it easier for workers of subcontractors to be recognised as 
employed by the principal company jointly with the subcontractor for the 
purpose of collective rights (Browning-Ferris Industries of California, 
Inc.) 48 .  This decision, adopted avowedly “to better effectuate the 
purposes of the Act in the current economic landscape” can prove a 
landmark one also for other future decisions on other fissuring practices 
such as franchising. Another case pending before the NRLB 49  will 
determine whether it is possible to include both employees employed 
solely by the user firm and jointly-employed employees in a same 
bargaining unit without both employers’ consent: a positive answer to 
this question would be pivotal in supporting non-standard workers’ 
collective right and promote solidarity with other workers.   
But also reviewing the standards for secondary actions and 
sympathy strike may be essential to foster solidarity and prevent 
																																																								
47 On the risk that restrictive laws on strikes may prompt unlawful collective action and 
cause more severe unrest than the one they are meant to avoid see M. Ford and T. Novitz, 
‘An Absence of Fairness… Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the Trade Union 
Bill 2015’ (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal, discussing a current bill aimed at tightening the 
regulation of union action and collective rights in the United Kingdom. For an analysis of the 
ineffectiveness of regulation of industrial action in essential services in South Africa, see T. 
Cohen and R. le Roux, ‘Limitations of the Right to Strike in the Public Sector and Essential 
Services’ in B. Hepple, R. le Roux and S. Sciarra (eds.) (n. 3). 
48 NRLB, Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015) 
Case 32–RC–109684  
49 NRLB, Miller & Anderson, Inc., Case No. 05-RC-079249. 
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conflicts. Existing restriction to these forms of industrial action may fail to 
keep pace with the changes in workplace’s organisations driven by 
vertical disintegration of businesses, and related fragmentising practices 
such as subcontracting. The Italian case is exemplary in this respect: 
secondary action in Italy is still criminally sanctioned under an article of 
the Penal Code enacted in 1930 by the Fascist Regime. In 1962 the 
Constitutional Court declared that sympathy strikes are legitimate when 
secondary actions are adopted in support of a pending primary strike 
carried out by workers in the same sector, when the relevant workers’ 
interests are affine to an extent that it is presumable that these interests 
would be frustrated in lack of a joint effort50. It is evident that any such 
standard is no longer suited to operate in a modern labour market and 
can be particularly detrimental to non-standard workers. Workers of a 
principal business, for instance, would not be able to go on strike in 
support of workers of a subcontractor unless they carried out a strike in 
the first place 51 . If these latter workers were scarcely unionised or 
reluctant to call an industrial action in fear of retaliation from the 
subcontractor or the principal business, the current standard would 
impede action from other workers. Moreover, in the current economic 
landscape of vertical disintegration, being able to act in secondary strikes 
only to support workers in the same sector is far too limited, as the 
production may be fissured among companies of several sectors. This is 
particularly true in the Italian industrial relation system, where a sector is 
normally defined by making reference to the national collective 
bargaining agreement applied. As several of such agreements may apply 
in the same production chain, the current standard for sympathy strike 
would prevent secondary action to a much greater extent than in the 
1960s, neutralising solidarity in favour of the weakest parts of the 
workforce, in particular non-standard workers52.  
																																																								
50 Corte Costituzionale, 28 Dicembre 1962, n. 123 in Foro Italiano, 1963, I C. 5 (n. 14). 
51 Also the French standard, set out by Cour de Cassation, Crim. of 12 Janvier 1971, D. 
1971 129, requires that a lawful primary strike is carried out to proceed with a secondary 
action.  
52 In this respect, it seems that the conclusions of the ECtHR in RMT (n. 27), deeming a ban 
on secondary action compatible with art. 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
by distinguishing between primary and secondary elements of freedom of association when 
assessing the legitimacy of the ban, overlooked the severe hardships that an increasing 
number of workers, most notably non-standard workers, face to organise in unions and 
exert their collective rights at present times. In such circumstances, a ban on secondary 
action could go as far as neutralising the sole realistic way of providing those workers with 
meaningful voice or bargaining power: the distinction between primary and secondary 
elements of freedom of association appears therefore to be artificial in this respect, also 
considering the comments of the ILO supervisory bodies and the ECSR with regard to the 
UK ban on sympathy action.  
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The same or even worse problems could be faced when cross-
border production and supply chains are involved. Domestic standards for 
sympathy actions were chiefly devised before globalisation, and the 
related steep increase in commercial and production exchanges, 
occurred53. As such, they could be ill-suited to serve in modern times: 
cross-border solidarity may be pivotal in supporting decent work 
standards in countries where weak labour organisation exist54, also via 
action from stronger national labour movements55. This is all the more 
relevant when codes of conducts, international framework agreements 
and other commitments are in place, which are not legally binding or not 
easily actionable in court. Less restrictive secondary action standards 
would enable workers to better monitor the compliance with these 
commitments and, where necessary, to sanction their “breach” by means 
of industrial disputes and collective actions. This would enhance 
enforcement of businesses’ commitments that may otherwise remain 
merely voluntary in nature and may be pivotal in securing compliance 
with other fundamental human rights’ objectives such as the effective 
ban on discrimination and child and forced labour. Freedom of association 
and collective rights might thus also act as enabling rights on a cross-
border basis: reassessment and revision of existing national standards on 
solidarity actions, conceived in an era when international business 
exchanges were far more limited, seems therefore essential to keep pace 
with the modern reality of the global economy. 
7. Legal restrictions to unionisation and collective 
bargaining of non-standard workers: the case of 
antitrust regulation. 
Solidarity, of course, is not expressed only by means of industrial 
action: it can also be exerted by other collective actions not involving a 
																																																								
53 See, however, the discussion already done in Lord Wedderburn, ‘Multi-national Enterprise 
and National Labour Law’ (1972) 1 Industrial Law Journal 12-19 and O. Khan-Freund, ‘A 
Lawyer’s Reflections on Multinational Corporations’ in (1972) 14 Journal of Industrial 
Relations 351-360.  
54 In this respect, also for further references and for a discussion of a potential role of the 
EU in the protection of secondary action, see P. Germanotta and T. Novitz, Globalisation and 
the Right to Strike: The Case for European Level Protection of Secondary Action’ (2002) 18 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 67-82; for a 
recent analysis that takes into account the developments at the EU level in this regard, see 
F. De Witte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
55  On transnational collective action see W. Warneck, ‘Transnational Collective Action – 
Already a Reality?’ in F. Dorssemont, T. Jaspers and A. van Hoek (eds), Cross-Border 
Collective Actions in Europe: A Legal Challenge (Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2007).  
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strike, in particular unionisation and collective bargaining. In the last 
decades, as mentioned above, traditional unions have undertaken strong 
efforts in organising, and negotiating on behalf of, non-standard workers 
in many countries. These initiatives are pivotal to serve the aim of more 
inclusive labour market institutions and outcomes. Nonetheless, some 
existing legal obstacles may hinder this trend. In some jurisdictions non-
standard workers may be prevented from joining unions56, or unions of 
their choice 57 . In other legal systems, collective bargaining can be 
restricted or banned in favour of self-employed workers for anti-trust 
reason58.  
This, for instance, may occur in the European Union, as an 
outcome of the recent decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 
1999, the ECJ famously granted collective bargaining of subordinated 
employees a partial immunity from competition law, in its Albany case59.  
																																																								
56 This is the case for workers with contracts shorter than 6 months in Viet Nam, pursuant 
to Directive 02/2004/TTR-TLD, issued by the Viet Nam General Confederation of Labour on 
22 March 2004. See I. Landau, P. Mahy, R. Mitchell, ‘The Regulation of Non-Standard Forms 
of Employment in India, Indonesia and Vietnam. A Study prepared for the International 
Labour Office, Geneva Switzerland’ ILO Conditions of Work and Employment Series Working 
Paper No. 63. In Poland, the judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal, 2 June 2015, 
declared that Article 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act of 23 May 1991 allowing only employees 
to establish and join a trade union only was unconstitutional: according to the Tribunal, 
freedom of association to trade unions applies to all individuals performing paid work. In 
2012, the ILO CFA requested the Government of Poland “to take the necessary measures in 
order to ensure that all workers, without distinction whatsoever, including self-employed 
workers and those employed under civil law contracts, enjoy the right to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing within the meaning of Convention No. 87”: see Poland – 
CFA,  Report No 363, Case No, 2888 available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_T
EXT_ID:3057194 (Accessed 8 October 2015). 
57  See Republic of Korea – CFA, Report No. 363, Case No. 2602 available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_T
EXT_ID:3237652 (Accessed 8 October 2015) with regard to self-employed workers in the 
Republic of Korea. See also Shin, K. 2013, ‘Economic Crisis, Neoliberal Reforms, and the 
Rise of Precarious Work in South Korea’, American Behavioral Scientist, 57(3), 335–353. F. 
L. Cooke and R. Brown (n. 23) also report that “in Korea, the law allows only employees 
‘working for the same employer’ or ‘in the same description of work’ to form a union, which 
limits the ability of contract workers to join unions”. 
58 See. C. Rubiano, ‘Precarious Workers and Access to Collective Barganing: What Are the 
Legal Obstacles?’ Meeting the challenge of Precarious Work: A Workers’ Agenda (n. 2); S. 
McCrystal, ‘Organising Independent Contractors: The Impact of Competition Law’ in J. 
Fudge, S. McCrystal, K. Sankaran (n. 1). 
59  ECJ, Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 21 
September 1999, C-67/96. A very recent analysis of the relationship between labour law 
and completion law is provided by S. McCrystal, P. Syrpis ‘Competition Law and Worker 
Voice: Competition Law Impediments to Collective Bargaining in Australia and the European 
Union’ in A. Bogg and T. Novitz (eds.), Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the 
Common Law World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). See also T.J. St Antoine 
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The 2014 ECJ case FNV Kunsten 60  regarded a collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated in favour of both subordinated employees and self-
employed workers in orchestras. The latter worked as substituted 
members of the regular orchestra players and, given their more unstable 
employment status, were afforded a premium compensation rate of c. 
16%. The ECJ held that collective bargaining on behalf of self-employed 
workers could not be exempted from the application of competition law 
and therefore falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.  A very 
problematic issue is that it is not clear what tests the ECJ would apply, 
when classifying work relationships for the purpose of application of 
antitrust rules to collective bargaining. In a paragraph of the decision, the 
ECJ states that: "As far as concerns the case in the main proceedings, it 
must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, on the one hand, a 
service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence 
of an undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own 
conduct on the market, but is entirely dependent on his principal, 
because he does not bear any of the financial or commercial risks arising 
out of the latter’s activity and operates as an auxiliary within the 
principal’s undertaking. This definition is based on antitrust concepts 
regarding independent activity on the market61 and may include some 
categories of genuine self-employed workers such as para-subordinate 
workers in Italy, arbeitnehmerähnliche Personen in Germany and 
trabajadores autónomos económicamente dependientes in Spain, as it is 
arguable that they do "not determine independently [their] own conduct 
on the market"62. Nonetheless, the ECJ’s ruling in FNV Kunsten continued 
by stating that the term "employee" must be construed on the basis of 
																																																																																																																																															
‘Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law’ (1976) 62 Virginia Law Review 603-31; 
G. Minda, ‘The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust’ (1989) 11 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment & Labor Law 461-539; P. Ichino, 'Collective Bargaining and Antitrust Laws: An 
Open Issue' (2001) 17 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 185–198. 
60 ECJ, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, 4 December 2014, C-413/13. For an analysis of 
this judgement and of the insufficient attention paid to workers’ voice mechanisms such as 
collective bargaining in the current EU’s discourse on sustainable development, see T. 
Novitz, ‘The Paradigm of Sustainability in a European Social Context: Collective Participation 
in Protection of Future Interests?’ (2015) 31 International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 243-262  
61 ECJ, Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, 14 December 
2006, C-217/05. 
62 A comparative analysis of the regulation on dependent self-employment is provided in the 
articles published in the (2010) 32 Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal Issue 2, Winter 
2010 and in A. Perulli, ‘Subordinate, Autonomous and Economically Dependent Work: A 
Comparative Analysis of Selected European Countries’ in G. Casale (ed.), The Employment 
Relationship A Comparative Overview (Geneva: ILO, 2011).  
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definitions provided under its juridprudence on employment matters, that 
is centred on a much stricter definition. The exemption would apply when 
“the essential feature of that relationship is that for a certain period of 
time one person performs services for and under the direction of another 
person in return for which he receives remuneration”63. The need for 
“direction of another person” recalls the employment-law test of "legal 
subordination" rather the “independence on the market” test of antitrust 
law mentioned above. A mere economic dependency would likely not be 
sufficient to meet the legal subordination test under the ECJ reasoning. 
Therefore, under this tight definition, the abovementioned categories of 
"dependent" self-employment such as para-subordinate workers in Italy, 
arbeitnehmerähnliche Personen in Germany and trabajadores autónomos 
económicamente dependientes in Spain would not be classified as 
"employees" and thus they would not be exempted from antitrust laws 
for the purpose of collective bargaining. According to the ECJ only “false” 
self-employed workers would able to bargain side-by-side with employees 
and to benefit from cooperating with established labour unions. Genuine 
dependent self-employed workers, a significant component of the non-
standard workforce64, would be prevented from doing so even if their 
weaker status in labour markets is recognised under the national 
regulation. In the ECJ’s perspective, this would also likely have significant 
effects on their ability to go on strike, as this right is mainly seen as 
functional to collective bargaining in the Court’s jurisprudence65.  
Recognising the right to strike and the right to collective 
bargaining as human rights would also call to review this limitation, as it 
would not make sense to preclude access to a human right on the basis 
of an individual’s employment status66. Once again, the rise of some 
																																																								
63 ECJ, Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College, 13 January 2004, C-256/01 
64  Eurofound, Self-employed or not self-employed? Working conditions of ‘economically 
dependent workers’. Background paper, (Dublin: Eurofound, 2013); OECD, OECD 
Employment Outlook (Paris: OECD, 2014). 
65 ECJ, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line, 11 December 2007, C-438/05; ECJ, Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettane e Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet, 18 December 2007, C-341/05. 
66 The CEACR had expressed concern over the case litigated in FNV Kunsten in Netherlands 
– CEACR, Observation, 2011 available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,
P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2327798,102768
,Netherlands,2010 (Accessed  8 October 2015) The right to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, enshrined in two of the Eight Fundamental Conventions of the 
International Labour Organisation are universal and applicable to all workers. According to 
the ILO Supervisory Bodies, these principles and right also apply to self-employed workers, 
see Turkey – CEACR, observation, 2010 available at 
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forms of non-standard work seems to be at odds with traditional 
limitations on union rights such as the rights to collective bargaining and 
action. 
8. The distinction between political and economic 
strikes: the shfit from “job-based-protection” to 
“market-based-protection” and collective rights. 
A further limitation in strike laws that was already described as 
inadequate almost 25 years ago67 and that in the current world of work is 
becoming increasingly arbitrary is the distinction between economic and 
political strikes. Giovanni Orlandini has recently shown how a vast 
amount of collective actions were called in Europe in recent years to 
protest against austerity measures68. This is one of the areas in which the 
boundaries between economic and political strikes are most blurred and 
his chapter reports of several actions in jurisdictions where political 
strikes are traditionally banned. Even if one assumes the phase of 
protests against austerity policies to be only contingent, the distinction 
between economic and political industrial action will likely blur in the 
future as a consequence of more structural trends in labour market. 
 It is almost commonplace that the model of job-for-life is 
receding in almost all sectors and occupations. At the same time, 
mainstream policy narratives have long been advocating the substitution 
of “job-based-protection” for “market-based-protection”, namely a 
system of protection centred on workers’ employability on the market 
and supported by unemployment benefits and active labour market 
policies to replace systems based on job stability69. Without entering into 
the debate on the opportunity and risks connected to these policies, if 
this is the scenario we are moving towards, the centre of protection 
would shift from the enterprise to labour markets as a whole. Since, as 
recently reminded by Silvana Sciarra, strikes are a fundamental means 
for workers to exercise their social power 70 , if the pivot of labour 
																																																																																																																																															
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,
P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2331273,102893
,Turkey,2010  (Accessed 8 October 2015);  Senegal – CEACR, direct request, 2011 
available     at   http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100 
_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:2
329671,103013,Senegal,2010  (Accessed 8 October 2015).  See also ILO CFA (57).  
67  Lord Wedderburn, ‘The Right to Strike: Is there a European Standard?’ in Lord 
Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and Europe: Selected Papers (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1991). 
68 G. Orlandini, ‘Political Strikes’ in B. Hepple, R. le Roux and S. Sciarra (n. 3).  
69 For a critical analysis of these narratives and references, see V. De Stefano (n. 40). 
70 S. Sciarra, (n. 25). 
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protection shifts, industrial conflict would need to re-shift accordingly. In 
such a situation, if strike were to be restricted as a mere means of 
collective bargaining and for individual workplaces’ issue, workers’ power 
to influence labour protections and policies at large would be severely 
curtailed, preventing them from recurring to a fundamental instrument of 
workers’ voice to influence policies that would affect their labour and 
social rights. Once again, non-standard workers, being normally more 
detached from their employers and mobile in labour markets, would be 
the ones bearing most of the brunt of these developments. 
9. Conclusions.  
This article has argued that some existing restrictions to collective 
rights and in particular to the right to strike are failing to keep pace with 
the growth of non-standard workers experienced in many labour markets 
in recent years and that these restrictions need to be revised. It has been 
argued that advocating for this revision does not imply to subscribe to 
the view that the Standard Employment Relationship (SER) is irreversibly 
disappearing in industrialised economies and or that it is not fit anymore 
to serve as a fundamental benchmark of employment regulation. Rather, 
it has been discussed how regulation is endogenous to the increase of 
non-standard work in many jurisdiction as such increase has certainly 
driven some legislative reforms in recent times but was also spurred by 
regulatory mechanisms and loopholes in existing  regulation. It was 
argued that some existing collective labour regulation are prominent 
examples in this respect as they may impose obstacles that 
disproportionately affect, or prevent, the exercise of collective rights by 
non-standard workers and therefore provide undue incentives to recur to 
non-standard work arrangements. Several of these restrictions have been 
examined, such as regulation imposing strike ballots, limitation to 
secondary industrial action, antitrust standards that prevent some non-
standard workers from bargaining collectively and the distinction between 
political and economic strike. A revision of these restrictions has been 
advocated to keep pace with the increasing spread of the non-standard 
workforce and the issues that it poses to existing labour market 
institution. As argued in the article, these issues have primarily been 
examined from the individual employment law standpoint and an 
extensive analysis of the relevant collective labour issues has been 
missing. This article has tried to fill some of these gaps but further 
engagement with these issues is needed from all the branches of labour 
studies.  
In assessing the suitability of existing collective labour regulation, 
this article moved from the classification of the right to strike as a human 
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right, a perspective adopted by many scholars and courts in recent 
times71: It has been argued that this classification calls for a revision of 
existing restrictions and limits to the right to strike and other collective 
rights to ensure that they are compatible with a human rights approach 
to these rights. It has also been argued that the human rights 
perspective in this regard is pivotal to ensure that the weakest parts of 
the workforce, and especially non-standard workers, who may be 
particularly subject to the employers’ managerial prerogatives and belong 
to the most vulnerable groups in labour markets, are not denied effective 
access to fundamental labour rights and protection of human dignity at 
the workplace. Special attention must thus be paid to make sure that 
regulation of collective rights keeps pace with the profound 
transformations that have occurred in labour markets in recent decades, 
particularly were those regulations were adopted with reference to past 
models of business organisations. Indeed, access to collective rights can 
be barred not only as a matter of fact, and attention should also be paid 
to how to remove or reduce practical obstacles in this regard, but also as 
a consequence of legal regulations that are increasingly outmoded in the 
current economic landscape. It has also been argued that removing legal 
and practical barriers would not only enhance fairness in labour markets 
but also remove reasons of more bitter frictions and risks of disruptive 
conflicts. In this perspective, collective rights recognised and enforced as 
human rights would also ultimately contribute to underpin the rule of law, 
playing an important role in building more just and democratic societies 
in times of globalisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
71 See notes 25 and 27. 
